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During the 1990s a number of important contributions to International Relations (IR) 
literature  were  made  investigating  the  importance  of  individuals  in  international 
politics,  not  least  in  the  areas  of  the  role  of  technical  knowledge,  norm 
entrepreneurship and the diffusion of values and ideas globally. These centred on two 
primary  sites  of  action;  firstly  in  international  organisations  designed  to  promote 
cooperative behaviour between states, and secondly in transnational political groups 
that  form  networks  between  states  with  shared  objectives.  As  Thomas  Risse  has 
pointed out, much of this work became overshadowed by the rapid expansion of the 
global governance literature, yet nonetheless is analytically more rigorous than much 
of what has been written on globalisation. (Risse, 2002) In this paper two influential 
contributions  by  Peter  E.  Haas  and  Margaret  Keck  and  Kathyrn  Sikkink  will  be 
revisited, and their relevance today reconsidered.  (Keck and Sikkink,  1998,  Haas, 
1992)
The case to which they will be applied is the study of the role of a group of 
key  individuals  who  participate  in  both  the  EU’s  European  Economic  and  Social 
Committee (EESC) and the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Governing Body 
(GB). Both institutions will be introduced and discussed in greater detail below, thus 
as far as introductory remarks go, the crucial point to consider is that both institutions 
have  an  established,  autonomous  role  for  representatives  of  trade  unions  and 
employers’ federations, and that both draw members from nation states. The observed 
phenomenon upon which this paper is based is that a small group of workers and 
employers’  representatives  participate  in  the  EESC  and  the  ILO  Governing  Body 
simultaneously,  and  as  such  represent  a  transmission  belt  between  the  European 
Union and a part of the UN system that is not through formal governmental channels, 
but instead through members of a transnational elite. The purpose of this paper is to 
explore  their  role  and  the  wider  significance  of  such  a  transmission  belt  for  the 
external relations of the EU. In addition, the paper will use empirical evidence from 
this case to consider the usefulness of IR transnational literature, and concludes with a 
series of suggestions for modifying the theories under consideration. 
This  paper  is  a  work  in  progress  and  from  the  outset  it  is  necessary  to 
acknowledge that interviews with practitioners have not yet been carried out, and for 
that  reason  the  paper  is  intended  to  serve  as  a  mapping  exercise  for  continued 
research. The paper is divided into 3 sections. The first looks in more detail at the 3/25
EESC and the ILO Governing Body, as well as the evidence of the transnational elite 
working  in  both  institutions.  The  second  section  considers  the  two  analytical 
approaches under consideration, while the third sets out a preliminary framework for 
critiquing them, based on the case study.
I. The existence of a transnational elite between the EESC and the ILO
i. The EESC and ILO Explained
The  European  Economic  and  Social  Committee  defines  its  purpose  as  a  ‘bridge 
between Europe and organised civil society’
1, and was formally established by the 
1957  Treaty  of  Rome.  Its  membership  is  divided  into  three  groups:  employers, 
workers  and  ‘various  interests’,  which  covers  a  diverse  range  of  civil  society 
organisations.
2  The heritage  of  the EESC  is  clearly demonstrated  by  the  fact  that 
workers  and  employers  federations  have  traditionally  been  the  most  coherently 
organised  parts  of  society  outside  of  political  parties,  and  thus  constitute  the 
foundation of civil society. Each EU member state nominates candidates in each of 
the three groups to be elected to serve on the EESC for a renewable four-year term. 
The  EESC  has  consequently  grown  in  parallel  to  the  EU,  and  currently  has  344 
members. Along with its size, its influence has also grown with the successive treaty 
revisions  of  the  Single  European  Act  (1986),  the  Maastricht  Treaty  (1992),  the 
Amsterdam  Treaty  (1997)  and  the  Treaty  of  Nice  (2000).  Its  influence  has  been 
deepened through the increase in the number of issue areas in which consultation is 
mandatory, as well as being broadened into an organ to give guidance to the European 
Parliament. Furthermore, around 25 of the 150 opinions issued annually are ‘own-
initiative opinions’, which allow the EESC to address any aspect of EU policy. From 
a cynical perspective the EESC appears to be little more than a token gesture towards 
greater democratic accountability to the wider European public, tokenistic because it 
does  not  fundamentally  alter  the  fact  that  the  majority  of  decision-making  power 
                                                
1 EESC website (accessed 18 April 2007)
http://www.eesc.europa.eu/documents/publications/pdf/booklets/EESC-2007-002-EN.pdf
2 This third group brings together representatives from sectors of economic and social life that are not 
covered by the first two groups, i.e. ‘farmers' organisations, small businesses, the crafts sector, the 
professions, cooperatives and non-profit associations, consumer organisations, environmental 
organisations, associations representing the family, voluntary associations, persons with disabilities, the 
scientific and academic community and non-governmental organisations’ EESC (2007) The EESC: a 
bridge between Europe and organised civil society, Brussels, European Economic and Social 
Committee. 174/25
remains  vested  in  the  Council.  From  a  more  positive  perspective,  the  EESC’s 
influence  comes  through  shaping  the  views  of  MEPs  and  directing  the  European 
Parliament in its co-legislative role. 
Workers’ and employers’ representatives fair much better in the International 
Labour Organisation. The ILO is unique among the United Nations system insofar as 
it is the only international organisation that grants legislative and executive powers to 
non-governmental organisations. The ILO is a tripartite organisation in which each 
national delegation is composed of four voting members, two of whom come from the 
government, and two come from the national employers federation and trade union 
federation respectively. The two non-governmental parties represent national interests 
but  are  also  coordinated  transnationally  through  separate,  dedicated  secretariats 
housed inside the ILO, and their independence is protected by the ILO constitution. 
The Governing Body (GB) is the ILO executive and ‘meets three times a year 
in Geneva. It takes decisions on action to give effect to ILO policy, prepares the draft 
programme and budget, which it then submits to the Conference for adoption, and 
elects the Director-General.’ (ILO, 2000) The Governing Body is composed of 56 
titular  members  (28  government  members  and  14  members  from  each  of  the 
employers’  and  workers’  delegations)  who  are  elected  to  serve  for  a  three-year 
renewable  term.  In  addition,  there  are  18  deputy  members  from  each  group  who 
attend meetings and these members are often promoted to full membership after a full 
serving  member  steps  down.  The  government  seats  are  allocated  according  to 
geographical regions, with eight going to Europe, seven to Asia and to Americas and 
six to Africa. However, within the 28 government members ten seats are permanently 
allocated to the states of ‘chief industrial importance’ (in much the same way as there 
are permanent members on the UN Security Council) except that in the ILO there are 
no privileged voting actions comparable to the veto.
3
Of  concern  to  us  is  the  allocation  of  non-governmental  seats.  Although 
formally allocated at the discretion of the respective groups, the four EU countries of 
‘chief industrial  importance’  (Germany, France,  Italy  and  the  UK)  are  very  often 
                                                
3 The states are Brazil, China, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Russian Federation, the UK and 
the USA. Article 7(2) and (3) of the ILO Constitution sets out the procedure for defining them. The 
provisional membership for 2005-2008 was published at the 2005 ILC  ILO (2005) Results of the 
election to the Governing Body of the International Labour Organisation 2005-08. ILC 93 Provisional 
Record 9. Geneva, International Labour Organisation.5/25
represented  in  both  the  workers’  and  employers’  Governing  Body  members.
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Similarly, a seat in each group is given over to a Nordic country, while either the 
Netherlands  or  Belgium  is  often  represented,  Spain  very  often  has  a  workers’ 
representative, and a number of seats are allocated to Eastern European states. Thus 
on balance there usually between five and seven Europeans in each non-governmental 
group, making between ten and 14 ILO Governing Body members from European 
employers’ and workers’ federations. By comparison, there are around 230 workers’ 
and  employers’  representatives  in  the  EESC.  To  what  extent  is  there  an  overlap 
between the two groups, and if so, what are the implications for the EU and the ILO 
of these ‘double-hatting’ elite individuals?
ii. Does ‘double-hatting’ exist? 
To what extent is the existence of ‘double-hatting’ individuals merely speculation? 
Two pieces of evidence will be presented showing that this is not speculation but 
actual  practice;  the  first  comes  from  an  interview  with  a  senior  trade  union 
representative from the United Kingdom, and the second is a comparison between the 
records of membership of the EESC and the ILO Governing Body, between 1990 and 
2008. 
Lord Brett served as the UK workers’ representative on the Governing Body 
from  1993  to  2005,  rising  during  that  time  to  become  the  most  senior  workers’ 
member, (GB Vice-Chairman) and was President of the annual International Labour 
Conference in 2003. The 2003 conference was also the first year the President of the 
EESC was invited to address the conference plenary (while by contrast a European 
Commissioner had addressed the plenary since 1970). The President of the EESC 
during this period, Roger Briesch, had served on the ILO Governing Body as a French 
deputy member between 1993 and 1995. Lord Brett clarified how this came about:
 [Briesch] was Chairman of the EESC. He was on the Governing Body of the ILO for three 
years  in  the  1990s  as  the  French  representative.  (…)  When  I  became  chairman  of  the 
Governing Body, he invited me to the Economic and Social Committee in Brussels to talk to 
the Committee and in turn, I ensured he was invited to come and speak to the ILC. And the 
                                                
4 Since 1990 Germany and the UK have had regular members in both groups, while France and Italy 
have either had two regular members, or one regular and one deputy member. 6/25
idea  was  to  have  a  much  better  understanding  between  the  EESC,  and  in  particular  the 
workers’ group inside there, with the workers’ group in the ILO.
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Thus two individuals who had served on the ILO Governing Body together in the 
1990s  a  decade  later  were  in  positions  of  greater  influence  and  set  about 
institutionalising relations between the two bodies. In the following years the ILO 
annual conference (ILC) was addressed again by Briesch in 2004, and also in 2005 
and 2006 by the incoming EESC President Anne Marie Sigmund. What is significant 
is that she was from the ‘other interests’ group and has no former experience of the 
ILO. The elite networking that began as a qui pro quo arrangement has become a 
formal, institutionalised link between the EESC and the ILO.
Another important illustration of the role of key individuals is to look at the 
rapporteur of important EESC opinions relating to the ILO. In 1995 the EESC drafted 
an own-initiative opinion on Relations between the EU and the International Labour 
Organization  (ILO),
6  which  responded  to  a  1994  European  Commission 
communication  on  the  same  subject.  The  Commission  document  was  in  turn  a 
response to the 1993 European Court of Justice Opinion (2/91) clarifying the legal 
competence between the EC and the member states concerning the ratification of ILO 
Convention 170 (Concerning the use of chemicals at work). The Commission (EC, 
1994b) communication advocated member states direct their correspondences with 
the  ILO  via  Brussels,  in  order  to  make  the  EU  position  consistent.  This  raised 
suspicions among both trade union and employers’ representatives who feared their 
privilaged  positions  at  the  national  level  were  being  undermined  by  greater 
government centralisation. The EESC opinion weighed in heavily in the defence of 
tripartism, arguing that the EU should not threaten the privilages currently enjoyed by 
workers’ and employers’ representatives at the national level. The rapporteur of the 
committee producing the opinion was Ms Engelen-Kefer, a German EESC workers’ 
group member and a regular member of the ILO GB since 1993. 
There is always a good relationship between the EESC and the [ILO] workers’ group because 
we had a number of personalities who were involved in both. […] [W]e had the personalities 
that could cross-fertilise ideas as required, which constitutes the institutional bond.
7
                                                
5 Interview, London, July 2004.
6 Official Journal C 102 , 24/04/1995 P. 0007
7 Interview, London, July 2004.7/25
Similarly we find the same pattern when looking at another important EESC 
report, the 2003 opinion on the ILO’s World Commission on the Social Dimension of 
Globalisation  (WCSDG).  This  time  the  rapporteur  was  another  member  of  the 
workers’  group,  Mr  Tom  Etty  from  the  Netherlands.  Lord  Brett  described  Etty’s 
importance as follows:  
Well, you take this World Commission Report of last February [2004]. (…) Etty was proposed 
on behalf of the workers’ group to be the mediator on the World Commission Report, which 
they’ve agreed to easily. He then gets appointed Rapporteur. He then decides who will speak 
to the Committee and in what capacity and where will be the hearings. He will go along and I 
will go along and explain what the World Commission Report is all about, and so we hope to 
get a strong opinion, saying ‘yes, this is a critical report and the important thing is to make 
sure  that  it’s  recommendations  are  implemented’,  and  that  will  hopefully  go  on  to  the 
Parliament and they will make a strong opinion before next year, when the G8 have to decide 
what to do with the report. The Presidency next year of the G8 is the Brits, who are also 
President of the EU during the second half of next year, so the idea is to gain the initiative put 
maximum pressure on the G8 to start the process of implementing the recommendations. 
8
Tom Etty was elected on the ILO Governing Body for the period 2005-2008, and 
remains an influential figure in the EESC. The opinion on the WCSDG report was 
highly  favourable  and  the  European  Parliament  also  passed  a  strongly  supportive 
resolution in favour. This example not only illustrates again how ILO issues are being 
handled in the EESC by ILO-friendly individuals, but also how there is a strategic use 
of the EESC as part of the European Union’s institutional architecture to influence 
policies elsewhere in the system. 
These three examples of ILO-EESC linkages are not unique. Table 1 (see end 
of paper) lists the overlapping membership in full. In the survey between 1990 and 
2007,  six  individuals  were  identified  as  having  served  on  both  committees,  four 
workers  and  two  employers.  For  much  of  the  period  two  ILO GB  members  also 
served on the EESC, although in the final period this rose to three, (although two of 
them  stood  from  the  EESC  in  the  period  2006-2010).  The  individuals  mentioned 
above  (Hornung-Draus,  Engelen-Kefer  and  Etty)  are  the  longest  standing  EESC 
members and the former two have also served a number of terms on the ILO GB. 
Table 2 details the exact length of time each individual spent where. 
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iii. Conceptualising the ILO-EESC transnational elite
So  far  we  have  established  that  there  are  credible  grounds  for  pursuing  the 
investigation of the links between key individuals participating in both the EESC and 
the  ILO  Governing  Body.  Not  only  was  personal  testimony  from  Lord  Brett 
considered,  but  further  research  illustrated  how  the  network  has  extended  over  a 
considerable period of time and while not previously adopting the formalised nature 
seen in the EESC President addresses the annual International Labour Conference 
(ILC), these key players ensured they gained positions of influence as rapporteurs for 
EESC opinions. If in doubt about the significance of the rapporteur’s role, Desmond 
Dinan  wrote  of  Altiero  Spinnelli’s  instrumental  role  in  the  EP committee  on 
institutional affairs, that he ‘served not as chairman but in the crucial capacity of 
rapporteur.’ (Dinan, 1999, 99)
There are a number of questions to be considered based on the brief analysis 
of the case study. The first is how should workers’ and employers’ representatives be 
classified and conceptualised? Their role in the ILO is explicitly non-governmental, 
although they are an essential component of the national representation of each state 
member of the ILO. Their executive and legislative powers make them integral to the 
institution, and thus not distinct from the governance structure of industrial relations 
in the world economy. The role of workers and employers in the EESC is similar, 
insofar  as  they  are  present  in  the  committee  explicitly  because  of  their  status  as 
organised components of civil society. Here too they are non-governmental, but once 
again they are institutionally embedded in the governance structure of the EU, albeit 
to a far lesser degree in terms of decision-making power than in the ILO. At the 
broadest  level  both  workers  and  employers  could  be  described  as  being  non-
governmental,  institutionalised  actors  within  a  specific  governance  structure. 
However, when turning to the existing literature (as presented below) we find that 
there is only limited congruence between this case and models presented. 
For example, Keck and Sikkink’s Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) 
capture the transnational component, and the sophisticated links between both groups 
circulate information corresponding to Keck and Sikkink’s definition of a network. 
(Keck and Sikkink, 1998) However, the ‘advocacy’ dimension is more difficult to see, 
since  both  parties  could  be  argued  to  demonstrate  behaviour  consistent  with  the 9/25
pursuit of interests rather than purely ideas and values. Similarly, when comparing 
this case to Peter Haas’ epistemic community work, we see that while both parties 
have technical knowledge concerning the working of specific fields of employment, 
and  that  trying  to  make  policy  without  their  insight  would  most  likely  be  less 
successful, they do not represent the scientific neutrality to national interests that one 
finds in, say, environmental issues. (Haas, 1992) How useful is the existing literature 
to understanding the unique role played by workers and employers in the ILO and the 
EESC?
The second question to consider is how do the ‘double-hatting’ individuals 
interact with the two institutions? What roles do they play and what do they seek to 
gain? As discussed above, both the EESC and the ILO are bound by the statutes to 
include  representation  from  workers’  and  employers’  organisation.  This  point 
reiterates the ambiguous relationship between the individuals as representatives of 
their constituencies (i.e. UK trade unions) and integral parts of either the European 
Union or ILO institutional structure. What responsibilities and loyalties do they have 
to each institution, and to what extent do their non-governmental credentials survive 
this encroachment? The same issue is raised when considering whose interests each 
individual is supposed to represent. In both the EESC and the ILO the individual is a 
national  representative  in  an  international  forum,  be  it  European  or  global. 
Simultaneously there are expectations that intra-group solidaritiy will ensure that all 
workers’ representatives share some common values in both the EESC and the ILO 
(generally along the lines of greater regulation of employment rights), and so too with 
employers’ groups (along the lines of less regulation). Central to our analysis will be 
understanding to what extent institutional loyalty crosses from the EESC to the ILO 
and  vice  versa.  The  evidence  presented  above  from  Lord  Brett  suggested  ILO 
Governing Body members seek to promote the ILO’s work in the EESC and in the 
EU in general. This constitutes a third identity imposed on the individual from the 
institutional  structure. Does this ‘ILO identity’ compromise their loyalties  to their 
other constituencies (for example putting the promotion of the ILO above the interests 
of German workers)? Is there an ‘EU identity’ that sees these individuals promoting 
EU  interests  in  the  ILO?  To  the  extent  that  these  exist,  they  constitute  the 
‘transmission  belts’  between  the  EU  and  the  ILO  that  circumvent  member  state 
governments. 10/25
Thirdly, what is the relationship between agency and structure in this case 
study? If we are going to focus on the role played by individuals that are strategically 
located at the intersection of two institutional, we are going to have to accept that 
agency has a role to play in the outcomes of both the EESC and the ILO. If this were 
not the case, then the individuals concerned would be of no significant interest in 
explaining  the  policy  outcomes  observed.  Nonetheless,  structures  are  enabling 
features  of  the  case  study,  since  as  noted  above,  both  Brett  and  Briesch  were  in 
positions of power in the ILO (President of the annual conference) and the EESC 
(President) respectively. Of central concern in this paper is the relationship between 
individuals  and institutions  and can  be divided  into  four related  areas.  How have 
specific individuals taken advantage of the influence accredited to the positions that 
they hold? How have they made use of their network of contacts through transnational 
elites  to  further  their  influence?  Can  the  aims  and  objectives  of  their  actions  be 
regarded  as  ‘milieu’  goals  that  are  of  general  benefit  to  the  widest  range  of 
constituents (or are they ‘possessive’, self-serving goals?) Finally, how has a network 
of individuals between institutions helped or hindered formal relations between states 
belonging to both the EU and the ILO? 
II. Theories of Transnational Actors (TNA) 
i. Revisiting TNAs in the 1990s
As  Thomas  Risse  has  pointed  out,  ‘the  1990s  saw  a  revival  of  theorizing  about 
transnatioanal  actors,  a  trend  that  was  further  enhanced  by  the  debate  on 
“globalization”’. (Risse, 2002, 258) The significant different between this debate and 
earlier ones  was that  the focus  has shifted  to  looking  at how transnational  actors 
(TNA) could shape state behaviour, rather than challenge the state as the central actor 
in the international system, and also that it opened up again the debate about the role 
of agency and its relation to structure. Risse lists five significant contributions to the 
literature on TNAs in the 1990s, but due to constraints on space only two will be 
considered in detail in this paper. 
Risse  identifies  James  Rosseau’s  Turbulance  in  World  Politics  as  the  first 
major work to look in detail at the role of individuals in world politics against the 
backdrop of the end of the Cold War and the undermining of systemic theories to 11/25
explain events. (Risse, 2002, 258, Rosenau, 1990) Another was Risse’s own edited 
volume  of  1995,  Bringing  Transnational  Relations  Back  In.  His  central  research 
question  is  ‘under what  domestic and international  circumstances do transnational 
coalitions and actors who attempt to change policy outcomes in a specific issue-area 
succeed or fail to achieve their goals?’ (Risse-Kappen, 1995, 5) Risse sets out to 
consider  if  domestic  or  international  variables  are  the  more  useful  to  explain  the 
differing levels of success of transnational networks, and whether ‘different domestic 
structures determine the variation in the policy impact of transnational actors’. (Risse-
Kappen, 1995, 25) After looking at a number of case studies and a typology of six 
types of state, his main conclusion is that TNAs are in all circumstances less relevant 
when states are weak both domestically and internationally. (Risse-Kappen, 1995, 22-
23, 311)
The third was Wolfgang Reinicke’s Global Public Policy: Governing without 
Government? In it he argues that globalisation is promoting economic integration and 
political  fragmentation  at  the  same  time,  and  through  this  ‘territoriality  becomes 
unbundled’. (Reinicke, 1998, 64) Reinicke frames his ideas in terms of ‘internal’ and 
‘external’ sovereignty, and the degree to which a state is able to operate effectively on 
both levels in the age of globalisation. A threat to internal sovereignty challenges ‘the 
ability of a government to formulate, implement and manage public policy’, while a 
threat to external sovereignty challenges the ability of a state to maintain its borders 
within the international system. (Reinicke, 1998, 57-8) Three possible solutions are 
posited; ‘defensive intervention’ by building barriers to the outside world, ‘offensive 
intervention’ leading to a ‘race to the bottom’ for competitive advantage, or ‘global 
public policy’. (Reinicke, 1998, 8) Reinicke advocates the third option and devotes 
the  length  of  the  monograph  defending  his  position.  Both  the  ILO  and  the  EU 
represent  efforts  to  promote  global  public  policy,  and  ‘the  formation  of 
transgovernmental  networks  is  a  necessary  condition  for  global  governance  to 
succeed’. (Reinicke, 1998, 219) Thus Reinicke’s argument is especially pertinent to 
the  general  theme  of  ILO  and  EU  cooperation,  and  supportive  of  the  claim  that 
transnational networks ultimately reinforce the role of the state in the international 
system rather than undermine it, albeit in an adapted governance structure. 12/25
ii. Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs)
Margaret Keck and Kathryn Sikkink developed their work on Transnational Advocacy 
Networks  (TANs)  based  on  non-governmental  organisations  (NGOs)  working 
transnationally in a number of specific policy areas. They developed a framework of 
analysis that has the potential to be highly relevant to the case looked at in this paper. 
Of  the  three  central  components  of  their  model,  the  workers’  and  employers’ 
representatives  tick  two  out  of  three  boxes.  Firstly,  they  are  clearly  transnational
because they are national ‘branches’ of a broader organisational structure stretching 
between states  but separate from state  authorities.  Likewise, both  the  workers’  and 
employers’ groups resemble the networks defined by Keck and Sikkink as ‘forms of 
organisation  characterised  by  voluntary,  reciprocal  and  horizontal  patterns  of 
communication  and  exchange’.  (Keck  and  Sikkink,  1998,  8)
9  Potentially  more 
problematic  is  whether  workers’  and  employers’  representatives  can  be  seen  as 
advocates. TANs are ‘networks of activists, distinguishable largely by the centrality of 
principled  ideas  or  values  in  motivating  their  formation’,  and  ‘they  often  involve 
individuals  advocating  policy  changes  that  cannot  be  easily  linked  to  a  rationalist 
understanding of their “interests”’. (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 1,9) Normative values 
play  an  important  role  in  identifying  TANs  and  their  advocacy  is  described  as 
‘plead[ing]  the  causes  of  others  or  defend[ing]  a  cause  or  proposition.’ (Keck  and 
Sikkink, 1998, 8) The question we arrive at is do workers’ and employers’ really count 
as advocates as Keck and Sikkink would define them, or are they more accurately 
described as being motivated by rational interests? 
Keck and Sikkink give additional examples of what they expect TANs to do, 
and taking guidance from these statements does suggest that workers’ and employers’ 
groups can be accurately described as transnational advocacy networks. Transnational 
advocacy networks ‘promote norm implementation, by pressuring target actors to adopt 
new policies, and by monitoring compliance with international standards’, and ‘their 
goal is to change the behaviour of states and international organisations.’ (Keck and 
Sikkink, 1998, 3, 2) These activities are entirely consistent with the EESC in trying to 
influence the European Parliament through its own-initiative opinions, and through that 
                                                
9 It could be argued that this definition of a network does not fit either a trade union or an employers’ 
federation because they have a hierarchical internal structure and include paid employees working for 
the ‘network’. However, two counter arguments are persuasive. Firstly, large NGOs mimic the same 
hierarchy and pay employees as the federations do, and more importantly, the network should be 
viewed at the transnational level between federations, rather than inside federations. 13/25
change  the  behaviour  of  EU  Member  States  and  thus  the  EU  itself.  Equally,  the 
arguments employed in the 1995 EESC report on EU-ILO relations stressed the need to 
preserve the tripartite structure of national coordination that they thought would be 
threatened by greater EU-level coordination on the grounds that it risked infringement 
of  ILO  Convention  144  (an  international  standard)  guaranteeing  tripartite 
representation. 
Taking  a  different  line  of  reasoning,  and  borrowing  from  Arnold  Wolfers’ 
distinction  between  possessive  and  milieu  goals,  can  we  argue  that  the  interests 
promoted by the ‘double-hatting’ individuals are in support of milieu goals rather than 
possessive ones? The example of Lord Brett appearing before an EESC meeting in 
order to encourage the EU to implement the recommendations of the report by the 
World  Commission  on  the  Social  Dimension  of  Globalisation  seems  to  be  more 
accurately  described  as  norm  promotion  rather  than  interest-based  politicking.  The
belief  of the  actors involved is that their  actions  will benefit all states, rather  than 
privileging a few at a cost to the many, and thus conform to the definition of milieu 
goals. Thus to answer the first question set out above, we can refine the definition of 
workers’ and employers’ representatives by regarding them as transnational advocacy 
networks.
Turning to the second issue of how do the double-hatting individuals engage 
with  the  institutions,  we  must  consider  the  EESC  and  the  ILO  Governing  Body 
separately because of the different roles and responsibilities of the representatives in 
each institution. Keck and Sikkink set out five conditions under which TANs can have 
influence  and  are  incremental  direct  effectiveness.  They  are  influence  on  (i)  issue 
creation and agenda setting, (ii) discussive positions of states and IOs, (iii) institutional 
procedures, (iv) policy change in target actors, (v) state behaviour. In the ILO the TANs 
have influence on all levels to varying degrees, including influence on state behaviour 
when acting through the ILO GB in cooperation with other GB members. However, 
there is little evidence of the ‘double-hatting’ individuals working to promote anything 
exclusively concerned with either their EESC membership or of specific concern to the 
EU. In the ILO, these members are principally concerned with performing their duties 
relating to their position as regular members of the Governing Body, representing a 
state and also a tripartite constituent.14/25
By contrast in the EESC the range of influence is far narrower, limited to issue 
creation and agenda setting, and on discursive positions. Influence could extend further 
into institutional procedures or targeting actors through the medium of the European 
Parliament, but certainly not directly. In contrast to the ILO GB example, evidence was 
found of some ‘double-hatting’ members acting on the basis of their ILO credentials in 
the  EESC,  (Briesch,  Etty,  Hornung-Draus).  This  leads  to  a  few  preliminary 
observations. Firstly, membership of the ILO GB is a pre-requisite for action in the 
EESC, meaning that there is a hierarchical distinction between the two. If this is the 
case  then  we  would  expect  only  to  observe  instances  of  initiated  action  by  the 
individuals in the EESC since the criteria for action there is membership of the ILO GB 
(not vice versa). Secondly, concerted action only takes place in the institutional setting 
where the individuals have less influence. This could be for a number of reasons. The 
first set of reasons is concerned with EESC factors, inter alia the willingness of other 
EESC members to allow them to lead; the lack of direct influence meaning opinions are 
less politically salient; and a lack of oversight of ‘double-hatting’ individuals by their 
domestic constituency members allows them to promote ILO-interests. The second set 
of  reasons is concerned with ILO  factors, inter alia a stronger secretariat reducing 
opportunities to act autonomously (in promotion of EU interests); a stronger shared 
identity  in  the  ILO  resulting  in  heavily  socialised  members  feeling  compelled  to 
conform with Governing Body expectations. 
iii. Epistemic Communities
In 1992 Peter Haas edited a special issue of International Organization on epistemic 
communities  and  their  role  in  shaping  international  policy  coordination.
10  Haas 
defines  an  epistemic  community  as  ‘a  network  of  professionals  with  recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-
relevant  knowledge  within  that  domain  or  issue-area.’  (Haas,  1992,  3) Epistemic 
communities  provide  advice  to  policymakers  with  sufficient  information  to  make 
informed decisions themselves, and by articulating their expert knowledge during a 
negotiating process between states, they help ‘states identify their interests, framing 
the issues for collective debate, proposing specific policies, and identifying salient 
points for negotiation.’ (Haas, 1992, 2) In the context of this case study, the question 
is can we regard workers’ and employers’ groups as epistemic communities? 
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The  theoretical  model  was  based  predominantly  on  case  studies  of  expert 
knowledge from the natural sciences being used to facilitate coordination between 
states, such as in environmental, health or communication issues. On first sight this 
appears to  resonate with  David Mitrany’s  Working Peace Theory,  but  unlike  ‘the 
functionalists, who turned their attention to the development of common activities and 
the  transfer  of  technocratic  loyalty  to  a  superordinate  authority,  the  concern  of 
[scholars  interested in  epistemic  communities]  is with  styles of policymaking and 
changes  in  the  patterns  of  policymakers’  reasoning.’ (Haas,  1992,  12)  Whereas 
Mitrany  sought  to  de-politicise  technical  issues  to  improve  global  distribution, 
epistemic communities de-politicise information relating to technical issues through 
their authority based on scientific methodology. This is a less ambitious project based 
on retaining the primacy of the state in the international system. Despite the fact that 
Haas states that ‘epistemic communities need not be made up of natural scientists; 
they can consist of social scientists or individuals from any discipline or profession 
who  have  a  sufficiently  strong  claim  to  a  body  of  knowledge  that  is  valued  by 
society’,  there  is  no  doubt  that  applicability  to  social  issues  such  as  employment 
policy is less straightforward that scientific ones. (Haas, 1992, 16) Haas gives the 
example of economists, and suggests that 
while economists as a whole constitute a profession,  members of a particular subgroup of 
economists –  for example, Keynesians or followers  of one of the schools of development 
economics – may constitute an epistemic community of their own. (Haas, 1992, 19)
Do workers’ and employers’ groups count as members of an epistemic community, or 
do they fall down on the grounds that they are either not scientific enough, or else not 
truly impartial? 
Haas performs a useful service by setting out in two 2 x 2 matrices what sets 
epistemic communities apart from social movements, disciplines and professions, and 
bureaucrats,  based  on  their  causal  beliefs,  principled  beliefs,  knowledge  base  and 
interests. (Haas 1992, 18 figure1). The four variables are described in detail and for 
the  purpose  of  illuminating  the  case  study  I  shall  concentrate  on  the  differences 
between  an  epistemic  community  and  a  social  movement  on  one  hand,  and  an 
epistemic  community  and  a  profession  on  the  other  hand.  Both  share  some 16/25
characteristics with an epistemic community, but also have important differences.
11
Taking the first example, Haas argues that an epistemic community and an interest 
group share principled beliefs and interests, but illustrates the difference between the 
two by citing the example of whaling, with an ‘epistemic community of cetologists, 
the economic  interest  group of  whaling industry  managers,  and  the issue-oriented 
lobbying  coalition  of  environmentalists.’  (Haas,  1992,  18) Haas  then  makes  the 
second distinction clear.
Epistemic communities must also be distinguished from the broader scientific community as 
well as from professions and discipline. Although members of a given profession or discipline 
may share a set of causal approaches or orientations and have a consensual knowledge base, 
they lack the shared normative commitments of members of an epistemic community. (Haas, 
1992, 19)
The  difference  between  academic  (professional)  associations  and  epistemic 
communities can be summed up by the members themselves, whose 
professional training, prestige, and reputation for expertise in an area highly valued by society 
or elite decision makers accord them access to the political system and legitimize or authorize 
their activities. Similarly, their claims to knowledge, supported by tests of validity, accord them 
influence over policy debates and serve as their primary social power resource. (Haas, 1992, 17)
Considering  these  points  together,  workers’  and  employers’  groups  have  a  strong 
claim  for  identification  as  a  epistemic  community.  In  their  favour  they  have  the 
diverse professional background, expertise and knowledge to provide genuine unique 
insight into the nature of employment relations. Against them rests the concerns that 
they  do  not  share  a  coherent  normative  commitment  (given  that  they  are  often 
ideologically  opposed)  and  by  extension,  that  their  ideological  differences  render 
them  no  more  than  interest  groups.  Alternatively  can  they  be  considered  as  two 
separate  epistemic  communities  within  a  larger ‘profession’ of  tripartite  industrial 
partners from civil society? 
In  order  to  address  this  issue  head  on,  let  us  consider  Haas’  detailed 
explanation of an epistemic community. To qualify, four conditions need to be met 
which we will assess individually. Firstly, an epistemic community requires ‘a shared 
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set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based rationale for the 
social action of  community members’. (Haas,  1992, 3) On a  macro  level  we  can 
identify these in both the workers’ and employers’ groups as their shared commitment 
to  tripartism,  dialogue  between social  partners,  the  importance  of  economic  well-
being (prosperity and reason equality) for societal stability.
12 Secondly, an epistemic 
community requires ‘shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of 
practices leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain  and 
which then serve as the basis for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible 
policy actions and desired outcomes’. (Haas, 1992, 3) This point is more problematic 
than the first one because on the one hand dialogue, consensus, the establishment of 
agreed standards and the international monitoring of them are shared between workers 
and employers. However, on the other hand ideological divisions exist between the 
two  concerning  the  optimal  level  of  regulation,  whether  it  should  be  minimal  or 
maximal, and what should be the role of the state in regulating activity. Different 
social models exist (e.g. Nordic, liberal/free-market) and there is no agreement on the 
causal mechanisms which promote desired ends. 
The third condition is that there should be shared notions of validity – that is, 
intersubjective, internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in 
the domain of their expertise’. (Haas, 1992, 3) The workers and employers’ groups do 
have these intersubjective criteria, insofar as they do subscribe to the idea of formally 
regulated social markets and that despite their ideological differences, they still both 
agree that they have something to argue over, so both accept the validity of their 
opponents  claims.  Finally,  an  epistemic  community  requires  a  ‘common  policy 
enterprise – that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to 
which their professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that 
human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence.’ (Haas, 1992, 3) This point refers 
us back to the initial normative positioning of the two groups, and their commitment 
to core values of the ILO and of the EU. Overall, the credentials of both workers and 
employers are consistent with many of the criteria set out by Haas, but importantly 
shared  causal  beliefs  are  uncertain  and  it  is  in  this  area  that  both  groups  could 
potentially  be  labeled  as  interest  groups.  Against  this  and  as  a  defence  of  their 
position  as  legitimate  epistemic  communities,  we  could  assert  that  workers  and 
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employers  constitute  two  separate  epistemic  communities,  much  like  schools  of 
economics are epistemic communities within a profession.  
III. Conclusions
The primary finding of this paper is that it appears that the transnational actors in the 
EESC and the ILO GB, workers’ and employers’ representatives, can be classified as 
both transnational advocacy networks and epistemic communities. Both groups meet 
the criteria for both models, and as such leads us to the question: does this mean 
TANs are the same as epistemic communities? In the literature the two are seen as 
clearly distinct  types of  TNA,  and  this  implies  that  the  findings  of  the paper are 
dubious. The source of the doubt can be attributed to one of two reasons. Firstly, the 
argumentation leading to classifying workers and employers as both is erroneous. The 
second is that the double-hatting individuals perform different roles at different times, 
and are therefore heterogeneous in character. Sometimes they appear to behave as 
members of an epistemic community, while at other times they behave as if they 
belong to advocacy network. Indeed, the possibility that ‘double-hatting’ individuals 
also play multiple roles according to the institution seems plausible. The remainder of 
the conclusion substantiates the claim in greater detail. 
i. The role of agency 
In the context of the material considered, Risse argued that the study of TNAs helps to 
counterbalance  the  tendency  towards  overly  structural  accounts  of  international 
politics. Keck and Sikkink consider the issue of agency in their model and comment 
that ‘what is so elusive about networks is how they seem to embody elements of agent 
and structure simultaneously.’ (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 5) Similarly, Haas notes how 
‘human agency lies at the interstices between systemic conditions, knowledge, and 
national  actions’. (Haas,  1992,  2)  This  is  not  new  however,  because  the  role  of 
individuals in international institutions has long been debated, most obviously with 
regard to the role of the United Nations Secretary General in international politics.
In this case study, the position of the ‘double-hatting’ individuals is similar to 
the case of the UNSG insofar as their position is rooted in the institutional design of 
the organisation, and as such is part of the structure. They fulfil a role that is defined 19/25
in purpose, duration and scope of action outside of the individual’s control. These 
individuals do not have the same degree of agency that an NGO member has, as 
measured  in  freedom  of  action.  However,  unlike  other  individuals  that  serve  as 
bureaucrats  in  an  institution,  the  members  of  the  EESC  and  the  ILO  GB  are 
representative  of  states  yet  not  part  of  the  government,  and  are  able  to  express 
national interests. Within the context of this paper, we have asked whether individuals 
that serve in two separate institutions simultaneously transmit interests generated by 
their unique dual roles. This does appear to have been the case, evidenced in the way 
in  which  double-hatting  individuals  took  strategic  roles  in  the  EESC  that  helped
promote the ILO agenda. The empirical research found a number of EESC opinions 
that  were  guided by  these  individuals,  although no  similar  investigation  has  been 
made within the ILO’s Governing Body. However, using Keck and Sikkink’s scale of 
influence, it was argued that the EESC was the less influential of the two institutions, 
and consequently more open to strategic use by the individuals. 
ii. Transmission belts
The  broader  picture  to  which  this  paper  speaks  is  the  extent  to  which  non-
governmental, transnational actors are able to influence the EU’s external relations, 
particularly with UN bodies. Which transnational actors exist, how do they act, what 
interests do they promote, and what impact does it have? In this paper addresses only 
the first and second questions, identifying the workers’ and employers’ members of 
the EESC and the ILO Governing Body as potential transmission belts by virtue of 
their  dual  role  in  each  institution.  Interview  evidence  formed  the  basis  of  the 
investigation, but archival research into the identity of the individuals concerns, which 
constituencies they represented and how long they served substantiated the argument. 
Appendix 1 shows a number of the EESC opinions that were produced with an ILO 
GB member serving as rapporteur
13. Through reading the content of the opinion, and 
comparing it to the substance of European Parliament resolutions leading on from it, it 
is possible to identify the areas in which the double-hatting individuals prioritised for 
action, and also to make an assessment of the impact they had. The data provided here 
is the first step toward making that assessment, although it lies beyond the scope of 
this paper. 
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The  conclusions  that  can  be  drawn  from  this  paper  suggest  that  the  ILO 
agenda is being loaded into the EU system, rather than vice versa. Given the small 
number of individuals, they are clearly in a privileged position with regard to being 
able  to  span  the  two  institutions.  Furthermore,  the  evidence  from  Lord  Brett 
confirmed the impression gained from the data that the overall number of individuals 
is small, and personal networks are important. Thus much of the influence enjoyed is 
through  the  double-hatting  individuals,  although  it  should  be  noted  that  relations 
between the two have been formalised through the EESC president addressing the 
annual International Labour Conference.  A second point to consider is whether the 
transmission  belt  between  the  EESC  and  the  ILO  is  promoting  specific  interests 
(either  ILO interests such as their own agenda) or broadly definable milieu  goals 
(such  as  the  promotion  of  core labour  standards).  Determining  the  congruence  of 
interests and ideas between the two institutions will illustrate the significance of the 
transmission belt, and the extent to which it is able to alter the course of the EU (or 
ILO). 
iii. Observing transnational actors
The final brief point to take away from this paper is the suggestion that a particular 
group  of  transnational  actors  could  appear  to  be  an  advocacy  network  and  an 
epistemic community. While there is undoubtedly a degree of overlap between the 
two definitions, more importantly this case illustrates that actors might not act in this 
same way in all situations, especially when the constraints on their action are in part 
determined by the institutional structure to which they belong. As was noted at the 
beginning, these individuals perform roles that are required by the constitutional and 
treaty agreements forming the ILO and EESC respectively. They therefore belong to 
the  structure  and  also  demonstrate  agency  too.  By  turning  our  attention  to  these 
actors,  we  risk  casting  them  as  static  entities  through  TNA  classification.  The 
individuals in this case study appeared to be more like an epistemic community in the 
ILO,  and  more  like  an  advocacy  network  in  the  EESC,  although  they  retained 
common characteristics throughout. Having granted non-state actors the capacity to 
shape international politics, it seems a shame to then fix them solid in a single TNA 
model. By failing to take into account their dynamic attributes to change according to 
the circumstances (institutional structure) in which they find themselves operating, we 
risk missing one of their most important strengths – their adaptability.   21/25
Table 1: Number of ILO Governing Body members also serving on European 
Economic and Social Committee (‘double-hatting’ individuals)
GB Session Members from  Workers/ No. serving on EESC No. serving on 
EU States Employers simultaneously (%) EESC in career 
14
1990-93 12 6/6 0 (0%) 1
1993-96 12 5/7
15 2 (17%) 2
1996-99 12 6/6 1 (8%) 1
1999-02 12 6/6 2 (17%) 2
2002-05 12 7/5
16 2 (17%) 2
2005-08 13 6/7
17 3 (23%) 3
Table 2: Key individuals serving on the ILO Governing Body and the European 
Economic and Social Committee
Individual Member State Group ILO GB terms EESC terms
John Svenningsen
1 Denmark Workers 1990-1993 1998-2002
Roger Briesch France Workers 1993-1996 1994-2006
Ursula Engelen-Keper Germany Workers 1993-2008 1990-2006
Thomas Etty Netherlands Workers 2005-2008 1990-2010
Ton Huntjens Netherlands Employers 1999-2002 2000-2006
18
Renate Hornung-Draus Germany Employers 2002-2008 1998-2006
Source material: (EC, 1990, EC, 1994a, EC, 1998, EC, 2002, EC, 2006, ILO, 1990, ILO, 1993, ILO, 
1996, ILO, 1999, ILO, 2002, ILO, 2005)
                                                
14 Some ILO GB members went on to serve on the EESC later in their careers. 
15 Including Finnish workers’ representative Mr Tapiola and employers’ representative Mr Hultin.
16 Including Polish workers’ representative Mr T. Wojcik.
17 Including Romanian workers’ representative Mr B. Hossu.
18 Ton Huntjens joined the EESC in mid-term, replacing Philip Noordwal.22/25
Appendix 1: Selected Rapporteur positions held by key individuals:
Ursula Engelen-Kefer: (Selected)
No. 1172: OPINION of the European Economic and Social Committee on Quality of working life, 
productivity and employment in the context of globalisation and demographic challenges (13 
September 2006)
No. 589: OPINION of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council on improving the portability of supplementary pension 
rights COM(2005) 507 final (20 April 2006)
No. 846: OPINION of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the 
Commission on the Social Agenda COM(2005) 33 final (13 July 2005) 
No. 527: OPINION of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a Directive 
of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2003/88/EC concerning certain 
aspects of the organisation of working time COM(2004) 607 final (11 May 2005)
No. 250: OPINION of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Proposal for a European 
Parliament and Council Regulation on the European Social Fund COM(2004) 493 final (9 March 2005)
(With Hornung-Draus) No.355: OPINION of the European Economic and Social Committee on the 
Communication from the Commission on Promoting a European framework for Corporate Social 
Responsibility COM(2000) 366 final (4 April 2002) 
No. 704: OPINION of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the 
Commission on the Framework for informing and consulting employees in the European Community 
COM(1998) 612 final (9 July 1999)
Renate Hornung-Draus: (Selected)
(With Etty) No. 252: OPINION of the European Economic and Social Committee on The Social 
Dimension of Globalisation – the EU’s policy contribution on extending the benefits to all COM(2004) 
383 final (9 March 2005)
No. 325: OPINION of the European Economic and Social Committee on Employment support 
measures (2 March 2004)
Thomas Etty: (Selected)
No. 213: OPINION of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the 
Commission under Article 138(2) of the EC Treaty on the strengthening of maritime labour standards
COM(2006) 287 final (15 February 2007)
No. 92: OPINION of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the 
Commission on Promoting decent work for all (17 January 2007) 
No. 238: OPINION of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Representation of women 
in the decision-making bodies of economic and social interest groups in the European Union (14 
February 2006) 
No. 1071: OPINION of the European Economic and Social Committee on Social policy within a pan-
European system for regulating inland-waterway transport (own-initiative opinion) (29 September 
2005)
No. 885: OPINION of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the 
Commission on Adapting to change in work and society: a new Community strategy on health and 
safety at work 2002-2006 COM(2002) 118 final (23 July 2002)  23/25
No. 194: OPINION of the European Economic and Social Committee on the Communication from the 
Commission for amending Council Directive 83/477/EEC on the protection of workers from the risks 
related to exposure to asbestos at work COM(2001) 417 final (22 Febraury 2002)
No. 937: OPINION of the European Economic and Social Committee on the request by the 
Commission for the Committee to draw up an exploratory opinion in anticipation of the Commission 
Communication on health and safety at work (17 July 2001)24/25
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